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THE PROLIFERATION OF AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES: A CURSE OR A BLESSING? 
Over the last two decades, the call for autonomous agencies has reverberated throughout 
all corners of the globe: many governments – from Great-Britain to Japan, from 
Tanzania to America – were unbundled into smaller agencies with a certain degree of 
autonomy. In most cases, these agencies carry out public services with sovereignty over 
policy design, decision-making and managerial matters. They are nonetheless tied to 
their respective ministry, because the political executives bear the responsibility for 
their performance. Well-known examples of services that are executed at arm’s length 
include tax collection, benefits administration, and scientific research. The rationale 
behind this agencification is that agencies are better equipped to deliver public services 
than the rather unwieldy government. Both the great expectations and the proliferation 
of semi-autonomous agencies raise the question whether the creation of these agencies 
is justified – i.e. whether their effects are in line with prior expectations.  
It is precisely this question that Sjors Overman addresses in his recent book Great 
Expectations of Autonomous Agencies. From a systematic analysis of 250 journal 
articles, Overman distills four expected effects of agencification – brought forward by 
academics, politicians, and practitioners. First and foremost, enhanced competition and 
leeway for business-minded managers can foster the performance of agencies, and 
therefore performance of the public sector as a whole (expectation 1). In addition, semi-
autonomous agencies are expected to be more responsive to citizens’ needs, leading to 
higher citizen satisfaction (expectation 2). Moreover, the disaggregation of agencies 
could induce the introduction of better accountability arrangements, such as audits and 
sanctions, because agency performance needs to be monitored (expectation 3). And 
lastly, one expects increased staff satisfaction due to a better person-organization fit 
(expectation 4). This expectation is deduced from the fact that agencies are single-
purpose organizations with their own HR-policy, which renders them eminently suited 
to select the right staff. These expectations are tested empirically, to determine whether 
semi-autonomous agencies have delivered on their promise.  
In contrast to the predominant line of research, which is based on cases, sectors, or 
individual countries, this dissertation aims to give more abstract understanding of 
agencification effects at a macro-level. The main reason to study semi-autonomous 
agencies at such a high level of abstraction is to overcome the problem of coordination 
effects: a public sector with a plethora of semi-autonomous agencies may become too 
fragmented to facilitate sound coordination between the agencies. It can thus be the case 
that public sector performance, citizen satisfaction, and accountability decline, even 
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though all agencies improve their individual performance (p. 41). A study of the macro-
effects circumvents this problem, because coordination flaws are necessarily included in 
the general outcomes. The underlying assumption is, of course, that there are sufficient 
similarities between semi-autonomous agencies to allow for a comparative evaluation of 
their effects. 
Overman unequivocally concludes that “if we strive for good performance, solid 
accountability, and happy citizens and employees, then creating semi-autonomous 
agencies in the way that we have until now, does not work” (p. 181). This surprising 
finding follows from the fact that none of the expected effects could be corroborated by 
the data. Firstly, the public sector is less efficient in those countries in which more 
services are delivered through semi-autonomous agencies (expectation 1). However, 
this effect has only emerged in recent years, which may indicate that agencification 
worked at first, but not after it spread to less marketable policy sectors. Secondly, 
countries with a relatively large number of semi-autonomous agencies are not related to 
increased citizen satisfaction as a consequence of agencification (expectation 2). 
Thirdly, the decreased accountability due to the disaggregation of tasks is not met by a 
systematic introduction of suitable accountability arrangements (expectation 3). And 
fourthly, the staff of semi-autonomous agencies is less satisfied with the organization 
after agencification (expectation 4). They are mostly dissatisfied about the results-
oriented mindset and about their career possibilities. 
The study employs three distinct methods to analyze the expected effects of 
agencification. A cross-country comparative analysis provides empirical input to test the 
first three expectations. Since the secondary data sources contain cross-sectional data 
only, it is impossible to descry causal relationships. The employed regression and 
cluster analyses could merely indicate that there was a negative relationship between 
agencification and public sector performance, citizen satisfaction, and accountability – 
not how the relationship is constituted. The study of staff satisfaction (expectation 4) is 
characterized by longitudinal data and could hence be conducted in an experimental 
manner. The analysis revolves around a comparison between the treatment group 
(agency staff) and the control group (ministry staff) in three organizations. In the last 
chapter, the study is supplemented with a qualitative method, the Delphi technique. The 
core of this technique is to present the results to practitioners, scientists, and other 
experts. This leads to a reflection on the results, and the formulation of new strands of 
research and practical recommendations. 
All in all, Great Expectations of Autonomous Agencies is a well-written and thoroughly 
conducted study that addresses a highly relevant question – arguably, one of the most 
important questions in contemporary public administration. Many countries, such as 
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Sweden, Romania, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have a public sector in 
which more than 70 percent of the executive tasks is agencified (p. 60). It is thus no 
exaggeration to say that semi-autonomous agencies have superseded traditional 
government. Moreover, agencification affects citizens directly: citizens use the services 
of the agencies and they are affected by the fact that semi-autonomous agencies may be 
less democratic and depoliticized. The results of this study call at least for an exhaustive 
investigation into the current edifice of semi-autonomous agencies, and perhaps even a 
radical revision. 
Another laudable feature of this dissertation is the clear research set-up. Overman 
elucidates why he examined precisely these expectations, how he studied the data, why 
specific predictors were used, and which theoretical underpinnings played a role in the 
expectations. This ensures the replicability of his findings, and helps the reader to 
understand not only what he reads, but also what he does not read. The study should 
furthermore be acclaimed for the innovative data-analysis and methodological 
contributions. Overman applies various methods – cluster analysis, model cross 
validation, difference-in-difference analysis, the Delphi method – that are a novelty in 
public administration. They enhance the validity of the results and the practical 
implications, and assist (in the case of expectation 4) in establishing causal relationships 
– features that are undeniably useful for all scholars in the field.  
Although the study provides a profound insight into the general effects of 
agencification, it leaves room for some critical considerations. A first point of criticism 
is that the data do not allow for a study of causal relationships, except for the case of 
staff satisfaction. Of course, this is a huge limitation because the research was all about 
establishing causal relationships. It should be noted that establishing causality is 
tremendously difficult and that some limitations follow from the nature of the data. And 
yet Overman could have done more to make his causal claims plausible – for example, 
by providing more control variables. This can be illustrated by the association between 
agencification and worse public sector performance (expectation 1): there is a statistical 
relation, but it is unclear whether the agencification itself has triggered the waning 
public sector performance.  
Two control variables would have been particularly interesting to include: the moment 
of agencification in a country, and the moment at which particular agencies were 
created. The former sheds a completely different light on the relation between 
agencification and performance. An apt example are the post-communist countries – 
which are ubiquitous in the data – that faced problems in the wake of the centralized, 
bureaucratic government of communist times. As a consequence, the idea of 
decentralization seemed appealing, whereas ministries lacked the skills and the 
resources to manage these agencies properly (Horvath, 2000). This implies that, at least 
in some countries, agencification did not impinge on public sector performance, but that 
agencification occurred as a reaction to worse performance – a reversal of the causal 
claim that Overman makes. As for the latter point, the moment of agency creation is 
Bouwe Meijer is a Master Student in Public Administration at Utrecht School of Governance (USG), 
Utrecht University, Netherlands. E-mail: bouwemeijer92@gmail.com 
Overman, S. (2016). Great Expectations of Autonomous Agencies (Doctoral Dissertation) 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 17, Iss. 2, 2016 
 www.ipmr.net  142 IPMR
highly relevant, because agencification is correlated with negative performance mostly 
in recent years: from the eight sectors in which agencification occurred before 1980, 
seven are correlated with a better performing public sector (p. 66). This suggests that 
agencification is only effective for marketable sectors to which it spread first, and not 
for agencies that are less marketable. Although Overman checked for correlations, it 
would have been stronger to include the moment of agency creation in the regression 
models, since this reduces the risk of spuriousness. In sum, the data allow for the 
inclusion of control variables that could serve as an antidote to spurious and reverse 
relationships in expectation 1, 2 and 3. This may have altered the conclusions, since the 
data seem to point at positive effects in certain sectors, countries and cases. 
A second point of criticism is related to the first, and concerns the question whether 
agenficiation can be understood outside its context. As the aforementioned examples (of 
post-communist countries and non-marketable sectors) reveal, agencification might be 
different in every country, sector, and case. Ironically, Overman repeatedly stresses the 
importance of context and yet forbears from addressing the context himself. He 
considers the context of agencies to be important because “Expected effects of 
delegation are moderated by contextual factors. Skilled staff, enough budget, and no 
counterproductive political interference are indispensable” (p. 44). And the context of 
agencification should also play a role, since “expectations should be analyzed in the 
delegation context, in order to make valid inferences about the effects” (p. 44). Given 
the assumption that the context is essential, it is unclear why Overman has not worked 
along those lines. There is no doubt that the study would have given a richer and more 
realistic account of agencification if contextual factors were incorporated.  
Perhaps a study of the macro-effects of agencification is too ambitious after all. Even 
though Overman’s assumption that agencies share “sufficient similarities to facilitate a 
comparative evaluation” might hold, the context in which agencies operate is not 
sufficiently similar (p. 168). A study of macro-effects dissolves the problem of 
coordination issues, but it poses another problem in its place: an all-too-general view on 
agencification without a real understanding of its effects. It is hence no surprise that the 
results were widely contested by the experts in the Delphi panel, which have in-depth 
knowledge of the specific effects of agencification. Future research should include both 
micro-effects about individual agencies and macro-effects about the public sector as a 
whole. This is feasible if researchers confine their study to one expectation only, 
because this enables them to grasp the micro- (e.g. a specific agency or sector) and 
macro-effects (e.g. performance as a whole) as well as the coordination issues. 
Despite these limitations, Great Expectations of Autonomous Agencies has some 
profound implications. It really challenges a key institution of the modern era: creating 
semi-autonomous agencies in the way we have done until now, might not work as well 
as expected. Neither public sector performance, nor staff and citizen satisfaction, nor 
accountability were found to increase after agencification. This is all the more relevant 
because the effects of agencification cut across numerous debates in public 
administration and society (e.g. efficiency, responsiveness, and legitimacy). Even 
though Overman’s results are a little too glib for an overhaul of the entire system, they 
are important enough not to be underplayed. The Dephi method and innovative 
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statistical analyses render the book valuable for all scholars in the field in public 
administration. But above all, the book is interesting for practitioners, citizens, and 
politicians all over the world who wish to enhance their general understanding of the 
effects of agencification – one of the most delicate topics in current governance. 
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